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A FATHER’S PRESENCE: 
FLORES-VILLAR V. UNITED STATES 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
JEFFREY HOCHSTETLER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law 
stands as a bulwark against restrictions based solely on sex. The Fifth 
and the Fourteenth Amendments require the government to consider 
individuals, not gender stereotypes, when it legislates.1 Nonetheless, 
both men and women have faced sex-based discrimination.2 To 
safeguard the right to equal treatment under the law, courts apply 
intermediate scrutiny, a form of heightened judicial review, to laws 
that create classifications based on sex.3 In Flores-Villar v. United 
States,4 the Supreme Court has the opportunity to apply this 
heightened scrutiny to a statutory scheme5 that makes it more difficult 
for fathers than mothers to transfer U.S. citizenship to their children. 
The outcome will depend largely on whether the Court’s exercise of 
intermediate scrutiny is vigorous or lenient. 
 
* J.D. and M.A. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Inherent differences between 
men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of 
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”) (emphasis added). 
 2. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (striking down a state’s 
discriminatory adoption statute because it rested on the impermissible stereotype that a father 
does not bear as close a relationship with his children as a mother does); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 
U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (upholding a state law prohibiting women from practicing law, 
reasoning that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil 
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon 
exceptional cases.”) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 3. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge . . . 
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
 4. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1878 (2010). 
 5. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(g) and 1409(c) (West 2011). 
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The Supreme Court’s application of intermediate scrutiny has 
been inconsistent. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,6 for 
example, the Court said that the government must show an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” in order to successfully defend 
a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of sex.7 In Nguyen v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service,8 however, the Court merely 
stated that “it must be established” that a statute does not violate 
equal protection,9 seemingly ignoring the high burden of justification 
placed on the government in Hogan.10 Additionally, the Nguyen Court 
dismissed the relevance of sex-neutral alternatives to a law that 
imposed requirements on fathers but not mothers,11 even though in a 
prior case the Court found the question of sex-neutral alternatives 
very salient.12 
In Flores-Villar, the Court may finally clarify what is required of 
the government under intermediate scrutiny. It could take a more 
stringent approach than it did in Nguyen, considering sex-neutral 
alternatives and requiring the Government to shoulder a heavy 
burden of justification. More likely, however, the Court will continue 
its lenient application of intermediate scrutiny and will accept the 
Government’s rationale for the law. This outcome would call into 
question the Court’s future commitment to heightened scrutiny in 
sex-discrimination cases. 
II. FACTS 
Ruben Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana, Mexico, on October 7, 
1974.13 His father, Ruben Trinidad Floresvillar-Sandez, a United States 
 
 6. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
 7. See id. at 724 (“[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the 
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification 
for the classification.” (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 
(1979) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 8. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 9. Id. at 60. 
 10. See id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In the first sentence of its equal protection 
analysis, the majority glosses over the crucial matter of the burden of justification.”). 
 11. See id. at 64 (majority opinion) (“[T]o require Congress to speak without reference to 
the gender of the parent with regard to its objective of ensuring a blood tie between parent and 
child would be to insist on a hollow neutrality. . . . The issue is not the use of gender specific 
terms instead of neutral ones.”). 
 12. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (invalidating a sex-
based classification where a sex-neutral approach would have achieved the same objectives). 
 13. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1878 (2010). 
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citizen, was sixteen at the time Flores-Villar was born.14 Floresvillar-
Sandez is not listed on his son’s birth certificate, but acknowledged his 
paternity with the Civil Registry in Mexico in 1985.15 Flores-Villar’s 
mother, Maria Mercedes Negrete, is a citizen and national of Mexico.16 
When he was two months old, Flores-Villar came to the United States 
with his father and paternal grandmother for medical treatment.17 He 
remained in the United States and grew up in San Diego with his 
father, grandmother, and siblings, but had little contact with his 
Mexican mother.18 Floresvillar-Sandez claimed Flores-Villar as a 
dependent on his tax returns for several years.19 
In 1997, Flores-Villar was convicted of importing marijuana and 
subsequently was removed from the United States on several 
occasions between 1998 and 2005.20 In 2006, after illegal entry, he was 
charged with “being a deported alien found in the United States after 
deportation.”21 Flores-Villar raised the defense that he was a citizen 
through his father, but this argument was rejected because his father 
did not meet the statutory requirement necessary for passing 
citizenship to his son.22 Because Flores-Villar would have been a 
citizen if his mother, rather than his father, had been a U.S. citizen, the 
present case seeks to resolve whether the statutory requirement 
violates equal protection. 
In determining whether a U.S. citizen transmits U.S. citizenship to 
a child born abroad, courts look to the relevant statute that was in 
effect at the time of the child’s birth.23 When Flores-Villar was born, § 
1401(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided, in 
relevant part: 
(a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth: 
. . . 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1878 (2010). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 
783 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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(7) a person born outside the geographic limits of the United 
States . . . of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a 
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, 
was physically present in the United States . . . for a period or 
periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were 
after attaining the age of fourteen years.24 
Because Flores-Villar’s father was only sixteen when Flores-Villar 
was born, he could not have been present in the United States for at 
least five years after turning fourteen.25 With a father who failed this 
“physical presence” requirement, Flores-Villar was prevented from 
claiming paternally-derived citizenship.26 
Accordingly, the Government filed a motion in limine in the 
Southern District of California seeking to exclude evidence regarding 
Flores-Villar’s claim of derivative citizenship. The court granted the 
Government’s request, concluding that “no reasonable juror could 
find that [the] Defendant could establish derivative citizenship 
through his citizen father. Therefore, any evidence of [the] 
Defendant’s father’s citizenship, residency, or legitimating acts is not 
relevant.”27 Following trial, the court found Flores-Villar guilty of 
“being a deported alien in the United States after deportation.”28 
On appeal, Flores-Villar argued that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act made “an impermissible classification on the basis of 
gender” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection under the law.29 Specifically, Flores-Villar argued that the 
lengthy physical-presence requirement, which applied to unwed 
fathers and not to unwed mothers, unconstitutionally discriminated 
against men. Section 1409(c), the provision applicable to mothers, 
states: 
Notwithstanding the provision of [§ 1401(a)(7)], a person born . . . 
outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have 
acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother 
 
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1974). The current law provides for a shorter physical presence 
requirement, allowing a citizen-parent to transfer citizenship to a child born outside the U.S. 
where that parent “was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a 
period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the 
age of fourteen years.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(g) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 25. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994. 
 26. Id. 
 27. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 
 28. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994. 
 29. Id. at 995. 
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had the nationality of the United States . . . and if the mother had 
previously been physically present in the United States . . . for a 
continuous period of one year.30 
A mother, then, can transfer U.S. citizenship to her child born 
abroad as long as she has been in the U.S. for one year at any time. By 
comparison, under the applicable 1974 statute, a father could only 
transfer his citizenship if he had been present in the U.S. for ten years. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”31 While no 
similar constitutional provision explicitly applies to the federal 
government, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause applies 
implicitly through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.32 
“All equal protection cases pose the same basic question: Is the 
government’s classification justified by a sufficient purpose?”33 That is, 
if the government distinguishes between two people for the purpose 
of treating them differently under the law, the government must show 
that its distinction is justified. All laws challenged under equal 
protection must at least meet the “rational-basis test,” which is the 
minimum level of judicial scrutiny.34 The rational-basis test is satisfied 
if the government shows that its classification is “rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.”35 In effect, this test is very deferential to 
the government.36 
Governmental classifications based on race and gender, however, 
must meet heightened judicial scrutiny. Laws that distinguish between 
persons on the basis of race face strict scrutiny: the government must 
show that the racial classification is narrowly tailored to further a 
 
 30. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(c) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 32. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (extending the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to the federal government via the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 33. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 669 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 34. Id. at 677. 
 35. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
 36. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“[L]egislatures are presumed 
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result 
in some inequality.”). 
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compelling governmental interest.37 Laws that distinguish between 
persons on the basis of sex, as here, must meet intermediate scrutiny: 
the classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to those objectives.”38 
A. Impermissible Sex Classifications Based on Stereotypes 
The majority of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding sex 
discrimination involves laws that benefit women to the disadvantage 
of men.39 Many of these cases deal with sex classifications based on 
stereotypes about a woman’s role in the family and as a mother. In 
Caban v. Mohammed,40 for example, a New York state statute allowed 
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of 
her child by withholding consent.41 The Supreme Court struck down 
the statute, holding it to be an “overbroad generalization in gender-
based classifications.”42 The Court expressly rejected the state’s claim 
that the distinction was justified by “a fundamental difference 
between maternal and paternal relations—that a natural mother . . . 
bears a closer relationship with her child . . . than a father does.”43 
While the Court recognized that the state had a strong interest in 
facilitating adoptions, the “undifferentiated distinction between 
unwed mothers and unwed fathers” did not bear a substantial 
relationship to that interest.44 Instead, the statute “discriminate[d] 
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they 
have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child.”45 
 
 37. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 38. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 760; see, e.g., Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982) (state nursing school only admitted women); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) 
(discriminatory adoption statute precluded fathers from withholding consent to an adoption); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state liquor law disadvantaged men, but not women). 
 40. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 394 ((quotation marks omitted) (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 
(1977)). 
 43. Id. at 388 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Transcript of Oral at 41, Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (No. 77-6431). 
 44. Id. at 394. 
 45. Id. 
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B. Permissible Sex Classifications Based on Biological Difference: 
Nguyen v. I.N.S. and Ambiguous Intermediate Scrutiny 
While classifications based on stereotypes generally will fail 
intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“physical differences between men and women . . . are enduring.”46 In 
Nguyen, the Court relied on these differences in upholding § 1409(a) 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which imposes a set of 
requirements on unwed fathers but not on unwed mothers for 
purposes of transferring U.S. citizenship to children born abroad.47 In 
addition to the physical-presence requirement of § 1401, which was 
not at issue in Nguyen, § 1409(a) imposes the following requirements 
on unwed citizen fathers: 
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is 
established by clear and convincing evidence, 
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time 
of the person’s birth, 
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide 
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 
18 years, and 
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years- 
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s 
residence or domicile, 
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing 
under oath, or 
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a 
competent court.48 
Unwed citizen–mothers, by contrast, only need to meet § 1409(c)’s 
one-year physical-presence requirement.49 
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the statutory sex classification 
must “serve important governmental objectives” and the 
“discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to 
 
 46. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). 
 47. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 48. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a) (West 2010). 
 49. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(c) (West 2010). 
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the achievement of those objectives.”50 In Nguyen, the Court posited 
that the government had two objectives. First, the government wanted 
assurance “that a biological parent–child relationship exists.”51 
Second, it wanted to ensure the existence of “real, everyday ties that 
provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, 
the United States.”52 
Given the number of Americans abroad, the Court noted that 
Congress could be concerned about the potential for burgeoning 
citizenship claims based solely on “male parentage subject to no 
condition save the father’s previous length of residence in this 
country.”53 The dissent, however, claimed that the majority only 
hypothesized about the purposes of § 1409(a),54 whereas heightened 
scrutiny requires the Court to “inquire into the actual purposes of the 
discrimination.”55 The dissent also argued that the majority failed to 
explain the importance of these governmental interests as required by 
heightened scrutiny.56 
The Court held that the discriminatory sections of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act were substantially related to the 
government’s two interests.57 First, by imposing a higher burden on 
fathers than on mothers, the statute provided assurance of a biological 
relationship because “[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated 
with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. . . . In the case of 
the mother, the relationship is verifiable from the birth itself[,]” but 
fathers need to take additional steps to verify their paternity.58 Second, 
with regard to ensuring meaningful ties between the child, the parent, 
and the U.S., the Court relied on the fact that a mother must be 
present at the birth of her child, but not a father. This difference is 
important inasmuch as “the opportunity for a meaningful relationship 
between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth”  
 
 
 50. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553). 
 51. Id. at 62. 
 52. Id. at 64–65. 
 53. Id. at 66. 
 54. Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 76 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996)) (emphasis 
added). 
 56. Id. at 77–79. 
 57. Id. at 65 (majority opinion). 
 58. Id. at 62. 
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for the mother.59 The father, by contrast, need not even know that the 
child was conceived.60 
The dissent, however, claimed that the majority’s substantial-
relationship analysis failed to consider the “tight fit” required 
between the means and ends because it ignored the availability of 
sex-neutral alternatives.61 The dissent queried, for example, why § 
1409(a) could not simply require that the parent be present at birth or 
have knowledge of the birth in order to show the opportunity for a 
meaningful relationship.62 This alternative would not draw a facial 
distinction between mothers and fathers.63 Moreover, “[t]here is no 
reason, other than stereotype” why a mother’s presence at birth gives 
assurance of an opportunity for relationship, but a father’s does not.64 
Because the physical differences between men and women do not 
sufficiently justify the discriminatory classification, the dissent 
maintained that the majority misapplied intermediate scrutiny, which 
requires an “exceedingly persuasive” justification.65 
C. Congress’s “Plenary Power” over Immigration: Fiallo v. Bell 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fiallo v. Bell66 further 
complicates the issue of what level of scrutiny to apply in the 
immigration and naturalization context. The Court underscored “the 
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”67 by 
upholding an INS provision that recognizes a mother’s relationship 
with her illegitimate child, but not a father’s, for purposes of 
preferential immigration status.68 Deferring to Congress’s broad 
constitutional powers in immigration matters,69 the Court declined to 
apply heightened scrutiny and instead maintained that “it is not the 
judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for 
the legislative decision.”70 
 
 59. Id. at 65. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 86. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 87. 
 65. Id. at 76 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
 66. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 67. Id. at 792. 
 68. Id. at 788–89. 
 69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”). 
 70. Id. at 799. 
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IV. HOLDING 
In Flores-Villar, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment and upheld the INS’s disparate physical presence 
requirements, echoing much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Nguyen.71 The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that 
intermediate scrutiny applies to statutes within the scope of 
Congress’s immigration and naturalization power.72 It held that even 
though § 1401(a)(7) imposes an additional physical-presence 
requirement on unwed fathers—as distinct from the “paternal 
connection” requirements at issue in Nguyen—”the government’s 
interests are no less important, and the particular means no less 
substantially related to those objectives, than in Nguyen.”73 
First, the court theorized that one “obvious rational basis” for the 
disparate physical-presence requirement is ensuring that children are 
not “stateless” at birth.74 Because many countries base citizenship on 
bloodline and not on place of birth, a child born to an unwed U.S. 
citizen–mother overseas might only be able to acquire citizenship at 
the time of birth through the mother. To the court, this policy “clearly 
demonstrates a ‘rational basis’ for Congress’ more lenient policy 
towards illegitimate children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers.”75 
Second, as in Nguyen, the court recognized the government’s 
interest in assuring a link between the father, the U.S., and the child 
who is to be a citizen.76 In response to Flores-Villar’s contention that a 
father’s length of residence in the U.S. says nothing about the father–
child relationship, the court referenced Nguyen’s discussion of 
Congress’s substantial discretion to choose what interests to promote 
and what “easily administered” means it may use to further those 
interests.77 
In effect, while the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the fit is not 
perfect” between the discriminatory means and the ends, it 
nonetheless concluded that those means are “sufficiently persuasive  
 
 
 71. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1878 (2010). 
 72. Id. at 995. 
 73. Id. at 996. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 997. 
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in light of the virtually plenary power that Congress has to legislate in 
the area of immigration and citizenship.”78 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Flores-Villar’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments 
Flores-Villar maintains that intermediate scrutiny should apply to 
because the statute creates a sex-based classification by having 
different requirements for unwed fathers than unwed mothers when 
transmitting citizenship to a foreign-born child.79 His first argument 
concerns the proper application of intermediate scrutiny, which is 
unsurprising given the Nguyen majority’s ambiguous level of review 
and the Ninth Circuit’s perplexing use of rational basis language.80 
Intermediate scrutiny requires courts to inquire into the actual 
purpose of the discriminatory residency requirements, instead of 
accepting the government’s post hoc rationale that the statute seeks 
to avoid statelessness.81 Flores-Villar points to the hearings 
surrounding the adoption of the Nationality Act of 1940 (which is the 
precursor of the statute in question) as revealing the stereotypes 
behind the law.82 During the hearings, a State Department 
representative claimed that a “non-marital child would, naturally, be 
raised by her mother, not her father: ‘If the child only has one legal 
parent, because it is illegitimate, if that parent, the mother, is a 
national, the child acquires nationality.’”83 Flores-Villar claims that the 
concern about statelessness does not enter into the congressional 
hearings at all.84 Thus, the government’s supposed interest in avoiding 
statelessness is far from the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
required to pass intermediate scrutiny.85 
Flores-Villar next argues that the government’s second asserted 
interest for the physical-presence requirement—that there be an 
opportunity for a meaningful relationship between the citizen–parent, 
 
 78. Id. at 996. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (U.S. June 18, 
2010). 
 81. Id. at 4. 
 82. Id. at 13. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. at 38. 
 85. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
731 (1982)). 
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the child, and the United States—likewise fails intermediate scrutiny, 
thus making Nguyen inapposite here.86 In Nguyen, the Court justified 
the additional steps a father needs to take to demonstrate an 
opportunity for parental connection because of the biological 
differences between mothers and fathers; birth itself creates the 
opportunity for mothers, but not for fathers. Here, Flores-Villar 
argues that “[n]o biological difference between men and women 
suggests that women form stronger ties to the United States in shorter 
time periods than men.”87 Without this biological justification, the fit 
between the statute’s discriminatory means and the government’s 
asserted interest falls wide of the narrow tailoring required to survive 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Finally, Flores-Villar argues that the level of deference owed to 
Congress regarding the entry of aliens into the United States per 
Fiallo should not “carry over into determinations of who is a citizen as 
of birth.”88 In essence, the question of citizenship at birth is different 
from questions of immigration and naturalization.89 Moreover, the 
supremacy of the Constitution is abrogated if Congress is allowed to 
trump the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in the exercise 
of a “plenary power.”90 
B. The Government’s (Respondent’s) Arguments 
The Government argues that rational-basis review should apply in 
deference to Congress’s constitutional authority over naturalization, 
which includes authority over citizenship matters.91 It is not “the 
province of the Judiciary to determine which foreign-born persons 
should be permitted to become members of our society in the first 
place.”92 To maintain this separation of powers, Congress’s 
determinations regarding statutory citizenship are entitled to 
deference by the reviewing court.93 
 
 
 86. Id. at 8. 
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. Id. at 15. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 18 (“Congressional power is limited by the Constitution itself . . . .”) 
(quotation marks omitted) (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)). 
 91. Brief for the United States at 16, Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (Aug. 27, 
2010). 
 92. Id. at 16–17. 
 93. Id. at 15. 
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Even under a heightened standard of review, the Government 
argues that Congress’s choice to impose a lower physical-presence 
requirement on unwed mothers than on unwed fathers is 
“substantially related to the important government interest of 
reducing statelessness.”94 First, unwed mothers and unwed fathers are 
not similarly situated with regard to the potential for having stateless 
children: 
[W]hen Congress enacted a new naturalization code in 1940, it 
understood that a majority of countries employed jus sanguinis 
laws [citizenship by blood] rather than jus soli laws [citizenship 
based on place of birth]. . . . In most of those countries, when a 
child was born to an unwed mother, the only parent legally 
recognized as the child’s parent at the time of birth usually was the 
mother. Although the child’s father could subsequently obtain the 
status of a legal parent through legitimation . . . the establishment 
of such a relationship did not occur as a result of the birth alone. 
Thus, the only parent eligible to transmit citizenship at the time of 
birth . . . was the mother.95 
To allow an unwed mother to transmit her U.S. citizenship more 
easily in this scenario, Congress chose to lessen the physical-presence 
requirement through § 1409(c). The physical presence required for all 
other persons to transfer citizenship—married men, married women, 
and unwed fathers—remained the § 1401(a)(7) standard.96 In keeping 
with this reading of the statute, it is precisely because of the biological 
difference between men and women with respect to childbirth that 
Congress adopted a shorter physical-presence requirement for unwed 
mothers. 
Accordingly, the Government contends that Congress was not 
motivated by impermissible stereotypes in enacting § 1409(c).97 
Contrary to Flores-Villar’s claim, the Government maintains that 
Congress was explicitly motivated by the statelessness concern.98 
When Congress added § 1409(c) in 1952, the Senate Report 
“explained that the change was appropriate to further ‘insure[] that 
the child shall have a nationality at birth.’”99 
 
 94. Id. at 31. 
 95. Id. at 32–33 (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. at 32. 
 97. Id. at 39. 
 98. Id. at 30. 
 99. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 39 (1952)). 
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With regard to the fit between the discriminatory means and the 
asserted objective of reducing statelessness, the Government argues 
that Congress did not need to tailor the law with “mathematical 
precision” in order to pass heightened scrutiny.100 Rather, it could 
address the problem it found to be most pressing—here, the potential 
for statelessness. Congress’s decision to do so “on a categorical basis 
rather than based on a case-by-case . . . assessment . . . represents a 
legitimate accommodation of foreign policy, feasibility, and other 
interests.”101 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Only eight justices will deliberate in Flores-Villar; Justice Kagan 
recused herself because of her position as the U.S. Solicitor General 
when the case was argued in the district court. This makes a tie or a 5-
3 split in favor of the Government the most likely outcomes. 
Regardless, there are many options open to the Court, and most turn 
on whether and how it will apply intermediate scrutiny. 
The Court, however, may not reach the merits for two reasons. 
First, Flores-Villar may lack standing to assert the equal-protection 
rights of his father.102 As the Government points out, it is not Flores-
Villar himself who has suffered the alleged sex-based discrimination, 
but rather his father.103 This is problematic for standing because a 
party ordinarily cannot seek judicial relief by claiming the rights of a 
third party.104 The second potential problem lies in providing Flores-
Villar with a remedy. Even if the Court determined that there was an 
equal-protection violation, it would have to decide how to fix it: if the 
Court required that unwed mothers meet the higher physical-
presence requirement of fathers, then Flores-Villar’s citizenship claim 
would still fail.105 During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts 
hypothesized that the Court could “look ahead” and say that “the 
only remedy that we are going to be able to give [Flores-Villar] is a 
 
 100. Id. at 41. 
 101. Id. at 42. 
 102. Id. at 10. 
 103. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 10–11. 
 104. Id. at 11 (citing Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)). 
 105. See id. at 45 (“Even if this Court were to determine that Congress’s decision . . . violates 
equal protection principles, petitioner would not be entitled to the relief he seeks—a reversal of 
his criminal conviction based on a determination that he has been a U.S. citizen from birth. . . . 
[T]he proper way to cure any equal protection violation would be to apply the longer physical-
presence requirements in Section 1401 . . . to unwed citizen mothers.”). 
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remedy that isn’t going to benefit him regardless of how the merits 
are decided, therefore we don’t reach the merits.”106 It seems more 
likely, however, that the Court will confront the equal-protection 
claim. As Justice Kennedy posited, the Court “usually talk[s] about 
substance first, remedy second,” inferring that it would be illogical to 
conclude that “because the remedies are so difficult,” the Court 
should abdicate its responsibility of scrutiny.107 
In deciding on the proper level of review, the Court will need to 
grapple with the degree of deference owed to Congress in the 
immigration context.108 If Fiallo’s deference only extends to 
congressional determinations about admitting aliens into the country, 
a lower standard of review is unwarranted here because this is a case 
about who is a citizen at birth.109 But, as the Government points out, 
Fiallo also dealt with the constitutional interests of U.S. citizens, and 
“rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny [of 
immigration statutes] is required when the constitutional rights of 
citizens are implicated.”110 
While this precedential question is sticky, the Court would be 
correct in concluding that constitutional protections are supreme over 
congressional enactments; after all, applying a lower level of scrutiny 
to constitutional violations in a particular arena of legislation 
amounts to an abrogation of the judicial role.111 Nevertheless, the 
Court might sidestep the whole issue by taking a page from Nguyen 
and refusing to answer the Fiallo deference question, finding no 
equal-protection violation in the first place.112 
If the Court proceeds to apply intermediate scrutiny it will need to 
determine its proper application. The majority in Nguyen provided 
little guidance, and this legacy of ambiguity can be seen in the Ninth 
Circuit’s confusing use of “rational basis” language during its 
 
 106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, United States v. Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801 (U.S. 
Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
 107. Id. at 24. 
 108. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 109. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 15 (claiming that Fiallo addresses the 
admission of aliens, but not citizenship by birth). 
 110. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 20. 
 111. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[I]n declaring what shall be 
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the 
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, 
have that rank.”) (emphasis added). 
 112. See Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 533 U.S. 53, 72 (2001) 
(deciding not to assess the implications of Fiallo, as there was no equal protection violation). 
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ostensible intermediate scrutiny review.113 During oral arguments, 
Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that if something like “rational 
basis plus” is used to resolve this case, the Court will continue “sort of 
tweaking the definitions and creating more variations on our review 
standard.”114 
A stricter form of intermediate scrutiny would require the 
Government to show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for its 
discriminatory classification,115 and to demonstrate that the 
classification “substantially relates” to that interest.116 Under this 
rubric, the Government would have a difficult time persuading the 
Court that a discriminatory physical-presence requirement is 
substantially related to reducing statelessness. A short physical-
presence requirement may indeed reduce statelessness among 
illegitimate children, inasmuch as it makes it easier for a parent to 
transfer citizenship. But there is no reason why the requirement must 
only apply to mothers. That is, the presence requirement itself might 
relate to reducing statelessness; the discriminatory classification does 
not. This conclusion is underscored if the Court seriously considers 
the availability of sex-neutral alternatives to the law, which is 
generally quite important in heightened scrutiny contexts.117 Here, it 
seems clear that Congress could have subjected all parents to the 
lower physical-presence requirement in pursuing its goal of reducing 
statelessness. 
Scrutiny questions aside, the Court may hold that the physical-
presence requirements violate equal protection based on Nguyen 
alone. Even under the Nguyen Court’s questionable level of scrutiny, 
it held that classifications will pass muster only if they are justified by 
the biological differences between the sexes.118 Flores-Villar argues 
here that no biological differences justify a longer physical-presence 
requirement for fathers than for mothers.119 The Government notes 
that Congress imposes physical-presence requirements primarily out 
 
 113. See United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. 
Ct. 1878 (2010) (inquiring into the “obvious rational basis” for the disparate physical-presence 
requirements). 
 114. Transcript, supra note 106, at 29. 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
 116. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 117. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 118. See id. at 63 (majority opinion) (“Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with 
regard to proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of different rules for each is neither 
surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective.”). 
 119. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 9. 
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of “a legitimate desire to ensure some tie between this country and 
one who seeks citizenship.”120 The asserted governmental interest 
served by the shorter presence requirement, however, is reducing 
statelessness121—an interest unrelated to that of assuring ties between 
parent, child, and country. The biological difference between men and 
women, then does not relate to the Government’s interest in physical-
presence requirements.  
However, if the Court chooses the Nguyen approach to 
intermediate scrutiny without adding rigor, it is likely to tolerate a 
looser fit between the means and the ends. This loose tailoring would 
permit a relatively tenuous biological argument to justify the 
discriminatory presence requirements. Such a “rational-basis plus” 
kind of review would also allow the Court to ignore the fact that sex-
neutral alternatives are available. Furthermore, it would give credence 
to the Government’s pragmatic argument that “apply[ing] different 
physical presence rules on a categorical basis rather than based on a 
case-by-case . . . assessment” is perfectly acceptable in light of 
administrative and efficiency concerns.122 After all, Nguyen seems to 
allow Congress to enact “an easily administered scheme” where a sex-
neutral or case-by-case analysis would prove too onerous.123 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Were the Court to take a lenient approach to intermediate 
scrutiny, it would be in danger of losing sight of the purpose behind 
the Equal Protection Clause. At the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection is the promise that individuals will not 
face discrimination simply because they belong to a particular class; 
“[i]nherent differences between men and women . . . remain cause for 
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or 
for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”124 Where a 
 
 120. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 21 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 41–42. 
 123. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69 (“Congress would of course be entitled to advance the 
interest of ensuring an actual, meaningful relationship in every case . . . . Or Congress could 
excuse compliance with the formal requirements when an actual father-child relationship is 
proved. It did neither here, perhaps because of the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties of 
proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular bond or tie. Instead, Congress enacted an 
easily administered scheme . . . .”). 
 124. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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father who raises a child cannot transfer U.S. citizenship as easily as a 
mother, the spirit of equal protection is offended. Without an 
extremely persuasive justification for the offense, substance 
impermissibly gives way to stereotype. 
